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Modern monetary policy focuses on infl ation 
expectations. It is consistent with modern 
monetary theory: new neoclassical synthesis 
(NNS). NNS gives the background of monetary 
transmission mechanism. New Keynesian 
Phillips Curve, IS curve (production equation) 
as well as central bank’s reaction function 
include economic agents’ expectations. The 
NNS and its implications for monetary policy are 
broadly described in the literature (Goodfriend 
& King, 1997; Galí, 2008; Woodford, 2003). 
Central bankers are continuously searching for 
the tools that would enhance their opportunity 
to infl uence infl ation expectations. Infl ation 
targeting (IT) framework of monetary policy 
is an optimal solution for the central bank’s 
functioning within the frames of NNS. IT 
constitutes various possibilities for shaping 
expectations of the public that is focusing on 
numerically set infl ation target, producing and 
publishing infl ation forecast, setting fl oating 
exchange rate regime, and, fi nally, ensuring 
central bank’s independence and transparency. 
Possibility of shaping infl ation expectations in 
the frameworks of IT is confi rmed in theoretical 
(Eusepi & Preston, 2010) and empirical research 
(Strohsal & Winkelman, 2015). However there 
are also research questioning such it (Kumar et 
al., 2015). Regardless some papers suggesting 
the central bank’s ineffectiveness in shaping 
expectations, IT is perceived as the best way of 
implementing modern monetary policy.
One argues that the central bank’s infl ation 
forecast is one of the most important tools of 
supporting infl ation expectations (Skořepa 
& Kotlán, 2003). Empirical research proves 
that there are interdependences between 
infl ation forecast and infl ation expectations 
(Szyszko, 2015). Other research (i.e. Brzoza-
Brzezina & Kot, 2008; Geraats, 2009; Faust 
& Svensson, 2001) confi rms the impact of the 
forecast publication on the economy and its 
performance as well as on the central bank’s 
ability to achieve its goals. The forecast also 
supports the Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) decision-making process. It offers at 
least concise framework for policy analysis but 
it can be even intermediate target for monetary 
policy.
The context of the central bank’s infl ation 
forecast is, however, quite complicated. 
It covers methodology of forecasting, the 
way in which the forecast is published and 
a possible impact of the forecast result on the 
central bank’s decision on the interest rates. 
The forecast of infl ation may even become 
intermediate target of monetary policy when 
the central bank implements infl ation forecast 
targeting (IFT). There is wide research into 
the fi eld of possible use of infl ation forecast in 
monetary policy (presented in next section). 
The central banks’ practice here also varies 
substantially.
The following paper is of methodological 
nature and it introduces the infl ation forecast 
targeting index (hereafter: IFT index). It has 
been designed to measure IFT implementation. 
Verifi cation of various hypotheses on the 
existence of the relation between the IFT and 
other aspects of monetary policy with the use 
of such index is possible. The IFT index gives 
also a concise framework of practical aspects of 
IFT. Such an index has not been presented in 
the literature up to now. The elaboration of IFT 
index is thus the main purpose of the following 
paper. Another goal is to discuss its possible 
implementations in the research as the index 
opens the possibility to further research on 
forecast usefulness in monetary policy.
One may ask a question at this point: the 
question on the validity of qualitative aspects 
measurement. The arguments in favor of such 
a measurement refer to the infl ation forecast 
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importance for monetary policy, both in the 
decision making process and communication. 
This measurement makes it possible to draw 
profound conclusions on the relations and 
causality. It also opens the fi eld for territorial 
and over-time comparison of the central 
banks’ practice. That is why the literature gives 
numerous examples of qualitative aspects 
measures.
The following paper is divided into four 
sections. The fi rst one presents the literature 
overview of the infl ation forecast targeting, 
which is the basis for designing the IFT 
aspects. It also highlights the importance of 
infl ation forecast for a modern central bank. 
The second section presents details on 
measuring transparency of the central bank. 
The literature in this case gives some solutions 
to the accepted ways of qualitative aspects 
measurement, including transparency. The 
third section is of methodological nature and it 
describes the tool (IFT index). The last section 
is on possible index implementation in empirical 
research.
The paper contributes to the literature on 
infl ation forecast targeting and broadly on 
infl ation targeting strategy. It also contributes to 
the discussion on measurement of qualitative 
aspects of monetary policy.
1. Infl ation Forecast Targeting: 
Literature Review
The infl ation forecast is an immanent part of 
a fully-fl edged infl ation targeting. A central bank 
produces its own forecasts, uses them in the 
decision-making process and reveals them to 
the public. Infl ation targeting, which is perceived 
to be the best monetary policy strategy by the 
consensus of NNS, may become infl ation 
forecast targeting (IFT), where infl ation 
forecast is an intermediate objective of monetary 
policy. It is by defi nition a current variable which 
is the most correlated with the fi nal goal, it is 
more controllable than the fi nal goal, and it 
can be made more observable. It can also be 
made very transparent and facilitate the central 
bank’s communication with the public (Debelle, 
1997). Moreover, infl ation forecast integrates 
a broad set of historical and current data as 
well as the expectations. It means that one 
variable – the forecast – includes the idea of 
analyzing various data, simultaneously giving 
the simplicity of following an intermediate target 
commitment. One argues that subscribing the 
function of an intermediate target to the infl ation 
forecast simplifi es both implementing and 
monitoring monetary policy (Svensson, 1997). 
The idea of IFT has been broadly described 
in the literature. The main threads of this 
discussion are presented below.
The central bank’s infl ation forecast for the 
period of infl ation forecast targeting horizon 
becomes an intermediate target. Hence the 
instrument should be set so as to make the 
infl ation forecast equal to the infl ation target. 
Following this rule is claimed to be the best 
central bank’s practice. Ex post infl ation 
may differ from the targeted level because 
of forecast errors (Svensson, 1996). The 
decision-making procedure of IFT is repeated 
by the monetary committee at any decision 
meeting. The forecasts and interest rate level 
are brought up to date if it is necessary. That 
is why IFT becomes a dynamic optimization 
procedure (Szyszko, 2013). The infl ation 
forecast may become the input to the decision-
making process of the central bank, even when 
the forecast is not published (implicit IFT). 
Revealing infl ation forecast makes it possible 
to fulfi ll the external forecast function: the 
explanatory one – regarding the decision that 
has just been made and enhancing the central 
banks’ ability to infl uence economic agents’ 
expectations. This broader approach to IFT 
constitutes a concise framework for both the 
decision and its communication. That is why 
from the practical point of view, infl ation forecast 
targeting encompasses two aspects (Fig. 1).
Infl ation forecast targeting may also be 
perceived as a monetary policy rule (Woodford, 
2012). As a rule, the IFT makes the decision 
making process more systematic and concise. It 
also facilitates the introduction of new members 
into decision-making body. Declaration on 
IFT implementation limits the possibility to 
infl uence the central banks’ decision as such an 
infl uence, if in contradiction with the rule, can 
be easily captured by the public. Finally, any 
monetary policy rule makes the MPC decisions 
anticipation easier, which supports expectations 
formation.
The central bank may produce the infl ation 
forecast under the assumption of constant 
central bank’s rates (CIR) and the central 
bank’s interest rates consistent with market 
expectations (ME). Such a forecast is called 
conditional (projection). Alternative option is 
interest rates endogenisation (unconditional 
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forecast). Forecasting methodology has 
been evolving over time from constant rate 
assumption to unconditional forecast. It is 
embodied in the discussion on the optimal level 
of the central bank’s transparency and the way of 
signaling its intentions. Producing and revealing 
policy path – the central bank’s interest rates 
consistent with the forecast is the next frontier 
in the central bank’s transparency. Overruling 
the assumption on the constant central bank’s 
rates brings the necessity to elaborate the 
MPC reaction function. It is mostly in line with 
the Taylor Rule which is an instrument rule. Its 
genuine specifi cations determine the changes 
of the central bank’s interest rates as the result 
of the actual infl ation deviation from the infl ation 
target (infl ation gap) and the deviation of the 
product from its potential level (output gap) 
(Taylor, 1993). Modern specifi cation refers 
to infl ation forecast or infl ation expectations 
instead of actual infl ation, which makes the 
rule forward-looking. The other possibility 
is a specifi c targeting rule which specifi es 
condition for the forecasts of the target variables 
(infl ation and output). The policy path should be 
set to ensure the equality of the marginal rates 
of transformation of the combination of output-
gap forecast into the two-period-ahead infl ation 
forecast and the marginal rates of substitution 
of infl ation in period t+j, for the output gap in 
period t+k. Then, the monetary-policy problem 
consists of fi nding the combination of forecasts 
and instrument path consistent with the central 
bank’s forecasting model (Svensson, 2003), 
(Woodford, 2013). The specifi c targeting rule 
is used in the Bank of Sweden. Regardless of 
the severe criticism, the Taylor Rule or similar 
specifi cations of reaction functions are more 
often used by the central banks.
The discussion on revealing a policy path, 
especially in a numerical way (on the fan chart 
usually) is still quite vivid. Only several central 
banks do so, that is central banks of: The Czech 
Republic, New Zealand, Israel, Norway, and 
Sweden.
Decision making rule depends on the 
way how the central banks’ interest rates are 
captured by the economic model. However, the 
starting point is the same: the instrument should 
be set to stabilize infl ation on the targeted level 
in the monetary policy horizon (Leitemo, 2006). 
The simplest version is just a rule of thumb 
applicable to conditional forecasts: if the 
infl ation target is above (below) the target within 
the monetary policy horizon, the main rate of the 
monetary policy should be raised (lowered). If 
the central path of infl ation in the monetary 
policy horizon is on the targeted level – no 
interest rates change is required. This is how 
the IFT was described in the earliest literature 
on the subject (Svensson, 1997). When the 
forecast is produced, the central bank makes 
a decision on the next change of the interest 
rates and nothing else. It is conceptually easier 
than giving the whole path of interest rates. 
This approach is still used by the central banks 
producing conditional forecasts. However, 
a more developed rule requires optimal policy 
Fig. 1: Extended approach to IFT
Source: own
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path for the entire forecast horizon. It is possible, 
in the way consistent with the model, only with 
the interest rates endogenisation. Moreover, the 
MPC may discuss several interest paths for one 
forecast. It chooses the one that in its opinion 
is the best solution from infl ation (and output) 
stabilization point of view (Svensson, 1999). 
When the policy path for a longer horizon is 
produced, the central bank’s decision in line with 
the forecast means following the path. As it is 
relatively easily when the forecast is up to date, 
the policy paths for longer term is not obeyed. 
There is empirical research which confi rms that 
the forecasts of interest rates had little or no 
informational value when the horizon exceeded 
two quarters (six months), although they were 
good in the next quarter and reasonable in the 
following one (Goodhart & Bin Lim, 2011). The 
reasons are obvious: in time the forecast and the 
policy path itself become stale. A new forecast 
with a new solution on interest rates appears. 
The central bank’s decision procedures are not 
designed to make decisions on interest rates for 
subsequent periods as well.
The discussion on the central bank’s 
transparen cy and its optimal level means 
nowadays deliberations on central bank’s forecast 
relevance as well as publishing other information 
connected with forecasting procedures (assump-
tions, model, errors, risk assessment, policy 
path). Transparency is benefi cial when it serves 
to simplify communication with the public and 
helps generate support for central banks to 
conduct the monetary policy optimally with an 
appropriate focus on the long-run objectives. 
However, it can complicate the communication 
process and weaken support for a central bank 
focus on the long-run objectives (Mishkin, 2004). 
The optimal level of transparency cannot be 
easily determined. The theoretical discussion 
on this issue is still in progress. The central 
banks’ practices in this fi eld are not unique and 
their choices are justifi ed differently. However, 
the transparency level of the monetary policy is 
largely aligned. The public knows the main goal, 
instruments and main premises of the decision 
making process, including forecasts. Moreover, 
the monetary authority explains the decision 
which has just been made. The differences are 
mainly connected with the intentions of future 
actions demonstration.
The point of view presented in the paper 
is as follows: the more information on the 
forecast revealed, the better. This is institutional 
approach to transparency (Winkler, 2000). 
The understanding of the information is not 
examined. Focus on institutional transparency 
is commonly used in the research.
2. Measuring Transparency 
of Monetary Policy: 
Literature Review
A section on the transparency measurement offers 
a brief explanation of the need and the ways of 
such a measurement. Infl ation forecast targeting 
is also a qualitative procedure. It is related to 
the central bank’s transparency which is one of 
the institutional (qualitative) aspects of modern 
monetary policy together with independence, 
accountability and credibility. As transparency is 
of qualitative nature and is not directly observed, 
the problem of the measurement appeared here. 
Descriptive analyses are not enough as they are 
Fig. 2: Measurement of qualitative aspects of monetary policy
Source: own
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not suffi cient for developed research, fi nding 
interdependences and causalities. Elaboration 
of the qualitative aspect measure facilitates 
the analysis of the relations between the level 
of their implementation and the central bank’s 
effectiveness or the economic performance. 
That is why, regardless of the reproaches of 
non-objectivity, measures of qualitative aspects 
are described in the literature and used in the 
research.
Authors Factors coverage Comment
Fy et al. (2000)   prompt public explanation of policy 
decision,
  frequency and form of forward-looking 
analysis provided to the public,
  frequency of bulletins, research 
papers, speeches
Quite narrow approach to 
transparency. First approach to the 





  publication of data and forecasts,
  communication strategy





  assumptions about key 
macroeconomic variables,
  the presentation of the policy-making 
process,
  the executive summary;
  expertise, completeness, writing style 
and information
On the basis of Infl ation Reports 
analysis; the authors delivered an 
overall rating of Infl ation Reports; 
quantity, quality and accessibility of 
information is assessed.
Eijffi nger & 
Geraats (2006)
  political transparency (openness 
about policy objectives),
  economic transparency (openness 
about data, models and forecasts),
  procedural transparency (openness 
about the way decisions are taken, 
achieved mainly through the release 
of minutes and votes),
  policy transparency (openness about 
the policy implications, achieved 
through prompt announcements and 
explanation of decisions),
  operational transparency (openness 
about the implementation of those 
decisions, in other words about 
control errors and macroeconomic 
disturbances affecting their magnitude)
This approach is frequently used in 
the literature (Dincer & Eichengreen, 
2007), (Siklos, 2010) to cross-
country and over-time comparison. 
Geraats taxonomy for transparency 
analysis was its background 
(Geraats, 2001). This measure is 
popular due to wide coverage of 
different aspects of transparency, 
consistency with infl ation targeting 
and detailed description of the 
points attribution, which facilitates 
measurement. It is also inspiration for 
other measurements (Bajalan Raei, 
& Tehrani, 2012) and the basis for 
regression analysis (Crowe & Meade, 
2008), (Dincer & Eichengreen, 2014).
Bajalan, Raei, 
&Tehrani (2012)
  openness of the policy (based at the 
Eijffi nger-Geraats index),
  clarity referring to presentation and 
analysis of information,
  honesty referring to the intentions of 
the information sender,
  common understanding referring to 
the linguistic code of both, the sender 
and receiver.
More developed conceptual 
framework of the index. It tries to 
capture the possible gap between 
intentions of the sender and 
understanding of the information by 
the receiver.
Source: own on the basis of the literature given in the table
Tab. 1: Transparency measures – the examples
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The way how the measurement is conducted 
is similar regardless of the authorship of the 
measure (Fig. 2). It starts with the identifi cation 
of the factors that infl uence the measure. 
The empirical and theoretical research gives 
a background of such an analysis. Usually 
a broad set of factors is enumerated here. It 
makes it possible to capture the changes more 
exactly in comparison with a simple one to one 
identifi cation. Then, the weights are attributed. 
Finally, the measurement itself takes place. 
Tab. 1 presents several examples of such 
measures. 
IFT procedure is connected with the central 
banks’ transparency in the fi eld of revealing 
forecasting methods, decision-making proce-
dures, decisions explanations and signaling 
central bank’s intentions. This is why Tab. 1 
presents several transparency measures. 
They refer to general transparency. They are 
all survey based measures – a questionnaire 
with factors affecting the transparency is used 
to quantify the level of transparency. Alternative 
measures of transparency refer to the market 
data: if the monetary policy is transparent, the 
news on central banks actions drive to less 
remarkable shifts in yields curves. This kind of 
measurement refers also to the central banks’ 
news understanding. Standard measures 
do not capture understanding.
Transparency measures differs with the 
authors‘ different point of view and the goal 
of the research. This subjectivity is most 
remarkable reproach to qualitative aspects 
measurement. Not the only one. It is also diffi cult 
to describe precisely whet the points should be 
attributed. For example, one of the questions 
in Eijffi nger-Geraats index is: Does the central 
bank regularly provide an evaluation of the 
policy outcome in light of its macroeconomic 
objectives? And the ½ point answer is: yes, but 
superfi cially.
The qualitative indices are also not resistant 
to the changes. When Fry et al. (2000) index 
was developed there was no discussion 
on revealing the central banks’ policy path. 
Nowadays the transparency on the fi eld of 
goals is quite obvious. The discussion on the 
optimal transparency focuses on the central 
bank’s intentions. Infl ation forecast and IFT is 
in the center of the debate on optimal decision 
rules and communication of future actions. In 
the literature, there is no complex measure of 
IFT implementation to capture and compare it.
However, there is a proposal of measuring 
transparency of infl ation forecast with 
a Guttman scale. Guttman scale makes it 
possible to discover intensity structure between 
several aspects (features, statement describing 
a variable). It is commonly used in sociological 
research. The starting point in scale elaboration 
is an assumption that a respondent that 
accepts advanced level (or aspect) of variable 
accepts the lower one as well. The scale offers 
Fig. 3: Guttman scale for transparency of forecasting system
Source: Chortareas et al. (2002)
EM_4_2017.indd   9 13.12.2017   12:53:23
10 2017, XX, 4
Ekonomie
hierarchic arrangement of the variable’ features. It 
is monotonic which means that the probability of 
accepting a statement on the scale is higher than 
accepting subsequent statement and lower than 
accepting the previous one. The scale organizes 
the features in such a sequence, that acceptance 
of a statement at any level means the acceptance 
of any statements which are on upper levels. The 
example of Guttman scale for transparency of 
infl ation forecast is presented in Fig. 3.
The scale may be modifi ed and enlarged 
with respect to its monotonic character. Main 
reproach to this measure is that forecasting 
procedures and the way how the forecast 
is published do not impose any hierarchy. 
The central bank may publish any element 
of forecasting system except the forecast. 
Capturing the sequence of the element is not 
necessary and may be binding. IFT elaborated 
in the following section offers alternative 
approach to measuring IFT, conceptually closer 
to monetary policy transparency measures.
3. IFT Index – Conceptual 
Frameworks
The IFT index elaborated here distinguishes 5 
aspects of IFT. They are presented in Fig. 4. 
While designing the components of IFT, it 
was assumed that IFT means several aspects 
of revealing the forecast as well as using the 
forecast as the input into MPC deliberations. 
That is why the aspects cover:
 forecasting methodology: including model 
that reveals the framework of the MPC 
analysis as it describes transmission 
mechanism of the monetary policy, and 
information on the assumptions for the cut-
off day of the forecast; producing the forecast 
is the fi rst step in IFT implementation;
 declaration: just prior to publishing the fi rst 
forecast (usually in the same document), 
the central bank should inform the markets 
what is the role of the forecast in the 
monetary policy; public announcement 
opens the fi eld for treating the forecast as 
the intermediate target;
 publication: to shape infl ation expectations or 
to become intermediate target (for the MPC 
and under the public control) the forecast 
should be revealed; the regularity of the 
publication and its higher frequency enhance 
the possibility to infl uence expectations; it 
also means that the central banker has the 
most up to date forecast possible; the way 
how the forecast is published (central path 
of infl ation alone or with the policy path) 
depends on the central banks‘ interest rate 
endogenisation and the central bank’s will to 
reveal its next possible steps;
 actual practice: crucial aspect of IFT, 
it checks the central bank’s decisions 
consistency with the infl ation forecast, in 
other words, it verifi es whether the rule 
is actually implemented, the way how the 
decision compatibility with the forecast is 
checked is described in Fig. 5 and 6; this 
aspect covers also decision timing – the 
analysis whether the central bank takes 
Fig. 4: IFT index aspects
Source: own
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the wait and see position, and the forecast 
in decision explanation (press releases, 
minutes, rationale of the decision);
 ex post evaluation: refers to the past 
forecasts and may be done either by 
comparison of the two subsequent forecasts 
or by ex post forecast errors; it explains 
why the decision made previously was not 
optimal (shocks), what happened in the 
economy between two forecasting rounds 
Fig. 5: The MPC’s decisions compatibility for conditional forecast
Source: own
Note: CPI – central path of infl ation – the most probable infl ation level during the forecast horizon
Fig. 6: The MPC’s decisions compatibility for unconditional forecast
Source: own
Note: CPI – central path of infl ation – the most probable infl ation level during the forecast horizon
 PP – policy path
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and it presents the forecasts accuracy 
(which has the impact on their credibility).
The IFT index covers a broad context of 
IFT implementation. Central banks are free to 
draw their own solutions in this fi eld, that is why, 
to enable the same way of points attribution, 
the detailed way of attributing points with the 
explanation is given in Tab. 2.
Points attribution for decisions comparability 
depends on the assumption on the interest rates. 
It should also consider that the IFT is just a fl exible 
rule for the monetary policy. It means that there 
is no formal obligation of following the message 
of the forecast. For many reasons the MPC may 
ignore the message of the forecast. This may 
happen when the staff owns the forecast. It means 
that the MPC is not engaged in the forecasting 
















½ – general or partial 
description 
1 – published
Points are attributed for forecasting model’s 
publication in any central bank’s document. 
1 point – transmission equations are published 
(without parameters).
Actualization when the model’s change occurs.
When there are several models employed – the main 
medium-term forecasting tool is considered.
Assumptions 0 – none
½ – some/different
1 – published
0 – there is no information on interest rate assumption.
1 – the central bank publishes also regularly the other 
assumptions on exogenous variables.








Regularity 0 – no
1 – yes
1 – the same publication schedule in subsequent 
years.
If the schedule is changed, point is not attributed 
at the fi rst time when the change occurs.
Frequency 0 – once a year 
½ – 2-3 times per year
1 – at least quarterly
If the forecast is produced with higher frequency, 






2 – numerically 
The most important information.
Qualitative information refers to the relation of the 
forecast in monetary policy horizon to the infl ation 
target. Quantitative publication of the central path 
of infl ation (CPI) may be presented on the chart.
Policy path 0 – no
½ – descriptively
1 – numerically
Qualitative information: description of the next change 
of the interest rates.
Quantitative information: a fan chart with policy path 
(PP).
Risk analysis 0 – no
1 – yes
One point is attributed in case of:













½ – not explicitly
1 – yes
Information on the forecast role in monetary policy.
½ – when it is given descriptively (ex. forecast is one 
of the inputs…).
1 – for the declaration on the greatest forecast 
importance or more detailed description of information 
relevant to decision-making process.
Tab. 2: IFT index points‘ attribution rules – Part 1
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process. Due to extraordinary shocks, the model 
inadequacy may be temporarily higher in MPC 
opinion. The qualitative approach to data analysis 
may prevail during the MPC deliberations. The 
system of goals of the central bank embodies also 
the output. Infl ation targeting is implemented in 
a fl exible way. Temporarily, the output stabilization 
may become main concern for the central bank. 
Finally, the MPC may take wait and see position 
and observe economic situation. Therefore, 
there is no naive and automatic reaction of the 
central bank in line with the forecast. The points 
attribution must also consider the fact that no 
change of the interest rates is also a decision. Fig. 
5 and 6 present the points attributing schemes. 
The fi rst one refers to the conditional forecast 
(constant interest rate) and the second one 
covers endogenous interest rates case.
If considering central path of infl ation it is 
necessary to compare it to the infl ation target 
in the monetary policy horizon (MPH): 4 to 
6 quarters ahead from the forecast starting 
point. CPI may vary during the monetary policy 
horizon. In order to calculate the IFT index it 
is necessary to choose the exact point of time 
for assessing CPI/target relation. Considering 
the beginning of MPH is necessary when 
the examination covers also expectation as 
it is consistent with the survey question on 
expectations. The second approach refers to 
the further part of the MPH. Comparing CPT/
target relation here means that the central 
bank has more time to infl uence economy and 
the economy has more time to absorb shock 
occurring when the forecast is produced.
The IFT index due to its division into 
5 aspects makes it possible to produce an 
additional measurement. When ignoring actual 
practice aspect, it delivers the possibility to 
measure only transparency of the forecasting 












1 – partial 
2 – yes
Information with the highest weight. The way 
of compatibility assessment depends on the forecast.
For 1 point answer: not following the message of the 
forecast when it is accepted in terms of the target 
defi nition (the MPC freedom point).
Detailed solution for describing points at that stage is 
given below the table.
Decision timing 0 – when the forecast 
is produced
1 – in subsequent 
months
1 point is attributed for:
  making decision when the forecast is up to date,
  no interest rate change in the period between 
two forecasting rounds.
If the decision follows the message of the forecast 
but in subsequent months – no points
0 – the decision is not in line with the forecast 





½ – only CPI
1 – communication 
focused on the 
forecast
Reference to forecast in decision rationale:
½ if only the central path for infl ation is described,
1 for dominating role of the forecast in 










n Past forecast assessment
0 – none
½ – one out of two 
possibilities
1 – both descriptions
½ is attributed for publication of:
  two subsequent forecasts comparison,
  past forecast errors analysis.
Source: own
Tab. 2: IFT index points‘ attribution rules – Part 2
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system. Additional analysis of the decision 
compatibility (according to Fig. 5 and 6) alone, 
shows the central bank‘s commitment to the 
rule.
The IFT index offers the opportunity to cross-
country and over-time comparison. It delivers 
consistent framework of IFT implementation 
analysis. It is a useful tool of verifi cation of the 
relationships between IFT implementation and 
central bank’s effectiveness and credibility or its 
ability to infl uence expectations of consumers, 
business and experts. It makes it possible to 
compare the decision-making procedures and 
the central bank’s attachment to IFT. Thus, it 
offers the possibility for further research. 
4. Possible Implementation of the IFT 
Index
The fi nal section presents briefl y the IFT index 
for two central banks: the Bank of England (BoE) 
and the Czech National Bank (CNB). They are 
both infl ation targeters with quite a long history 
of infl ation forecast implementation. The sample 
is described in Tab. 3. Both central banks refer 
to the forecast in the monetary policy. They use 
different interest rate assumptions.
Tab. 4 presents mean values of the 
index for both countries. The CNB was more 
consistent in IFT implementation with the 
mean index value of 85%. It also outperforms 
the BoE on the fi eld of forecasting system 
transparency. The difference in decisions’ 
compatibility between the central banks’ is 
remarkable: according to the methodology 
presented in section 3, the BoE decisions 
covered IFT logic only in 42% in comparison to 
90% in the case of the CNB.
Fig. 7 presents the evolution of the IFT 
index of the BoE during the research period, 
Fig. 8 – IFT index for the CNB. Fig. 7 does 
not capture any substantial change in IFT 
implementation. Its fl uctuations are due mainly 
to decisions’ compatibility or non-compatibility 
with the forecast and irregular publication 
of additional information. Fig. 8 captures 
remarkable institutional change in infl ation 
forecast targeting. At the beginning of 2008 
Feature BoE CNB
Infl ation targeting introduction 1992 (since 1998 independence in decisions on interest rates) 1998
First forecast publication January 1998 April 2001
Research period Jan 1998 – Dec 2014 Apr 2001 – Dec 2014
Interest rate assumption CIR, ME, both are published, ME as the fi rst one since Aug 2004 CIR, since July 2002 endogenous
Number of forecast 68 55
Number of decisions 203 136
Source: own
Feature BoE CNB
Mean IFT index 9.38 (67%) 11.85 (85%)
IFT σ 1.1 1.6
Mean transparency 7.36 (74%) 8.27 (83%)
Decisions compatibility 0.84 (42%) 1.80 (90%)
Source: own
Tab. 3: Sample description
Tab. 4: Mean results on IFT index
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Fig. 7: IFT index of the Bank of England in 1998-2014
Source: own
Fig. 8: IFT index of the Czech National Bank in 2001-2014
Source: own
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the CNB switched to DSGE model (Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium Model) at the 
same time revealing numerically policy path. 
The enhanced transparency (covering also risk 
description) resulted in higher IFT index.
The Bank of England used the forecast 
in the research period in a similar way. The 
level of IFT was just in line with its declaration 
on the forecast importance in the monetary 
policy. The BoE did not switch to interest rates 
endogenisation. Its communication after the 
MPC meeting covered the message of the 
forecast, however, the forecast never gained 
a central position in the decision explanation.
The CNB commitment to IFT was really 
strong. The central bank followed the message 
of the forecast even in the most turbulent 
period of fi nancial crisis eruption in Europe. 
Its attitude is confi rmed by the analysis of 
the point attribution to the timing. The CNB 
made decisions on the interest change (if 
such a change was necessary) just after 
producing the forecast. It did not take wait and 
see position. The CNB communication on the 
decision also focused on the forecast. Not only 
was the central path of infl ation and policy path 
presented but also balance of risk. During the 
MPC meetings in the months in which there 
was no forecast, the MPC discussion focused 
on the assumption divergence from the starting 
point level and its possible impact on the central 
path for infl ation.
Conclusions
The paper presents a conceptual framework 
of the analysis and measurement of infl ation 
forecast targeting. No consistent IFT index 
has been presented in the literature up to now. 
The need for such a measurement is obvious 
as according to the modern monetary theory, 
monetary policy needs to be forward-looking. 
The best way to implement forward-lookingness 
is the reference to the forecast in the monetary 
policy. The central bank’s forecast of infl ation 
(and other variables) facilitates a decision-
making process. It may even become the 
monetary policy intermediate target, at least 
implicitly (without such a declaration). It also 
draws the framework for the central banks 
discussion. On the other hand, publishing the 
forecast and information on forecasting system 
may enhance the central bank’s impact on 
expectations.
The IFT index covers all aspect of the 
forecast use. However, it is possible that after 
some time additional questions will be needed. 
The fi rst proposal on measuring central bank 
transparency covered goals and decisions 
publication. Nowadays this seems obvious. The 
policy path publication differentiates the central 
banks. The next step in transparency is also 
possible. The example is publication of bilateral 
exchange rate forecast done by the CNB since 
2009. The index may evolve with the evolution 
of the monetary policy.
The researchers have always searched for 
tools for verifi cation relations existence. IFT 
index is such a tool. It is easily applicable as 
the way of point attribution is consistent with the 
practice of modern central banks. Up to now the 
index has been used to compare the level of 
consistency in the infl ation forecast targeting 
and the interdependences of the forecast and 
infl ation expectations of consumers (Szyszko, 
2015). Measurement of the IFT requires the 
reading of Infl ation Reports (or equivalent 
documents) and central bank’s statements. It 
draws a broader context for monetary policy 
and its implementation in the central bank 
covered by the examination.
The need of IFT index elaboration is obvious 
also in the light of the on-going discussion 
on the central bank’s options for signaling 
its intentions. Various versions of forward 
guidance are discussed including quantitative 
forward guidance which takes form of policy 
path publication in a numerical way (Svensson, 
2015; Woodford, 2013). This paper opens the 
discussion not on the need of IFT measurement 
but on possible improvements of the index.
The contribution presents the results of 
research fi nanced by the National Science 
Center: Interdependences of Infl ation 
Forecasts and Infl ation Expectations of Market 
Participants. Implications for the Central Banks 
contract No.: 2011/03/B/HS4/03705.
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MEASURMENET OF INFLATION FORECAST TARGETING. A PROPOSAL 
OF METHODOLOGICAL SOLUTION
Magdalena Szyszko
The paper offers a methodological solution to measuring infl ation forecast targeting (IFT). IFT is 
a central bank’s procedure which consists in: producing its own infl ation forecast, revealing its 
results and making interest rates decisions on the basis of the forecast. Infl ation forecast targeting 
is implemented, to some extent, by any central bank implementing infl ation targeting framework. It 
facilitates the forward-looking attitude of the central banker. This forward-lookingness facilitates the 
expectations shaping and goals achievement. The literature on IFT is broad but it does not cover 
a concise framework for IFT analysis and measurement. The following contribution fi lls in this gap. 
It presents the IFT index. The idea of its elaboration is in line with any monetary policy qualitative 
aspects measurement: 5 aspects of IFT are distinguished, each of which having a system of points 
attribution described. These aspects are: forecasting methodology, declaration on the forecast role 
in the monetary policy, forecast publication, actual central bank’s practice and ex post forecast 
evaluation. Actual central bank’s practice covers the assessment of the central bank’s decision 
compatibility with the message of the forecast. The multivariate scheme of assessment which 
considers central bank’s fl exibility in the decision making process – guaranteed by the framework 
of the infl ation targeting – is elaborated. The other IFT aspects’ evaluations consist in the analysis 
of the information revealed. The IFT can be divided into two sub indices: one covering only the 
forecasting system transparency and the other one – for decisions compatibility check. The IFT 
index and sub-indices are universal in the sense of considering the IFT broadly on the basis of 
various central bank’s practice. The index can be used to cross-country and over time comparison 
– such an example is also presented in the paper. It also makes it possible to verify the hypotheses 
on the central banks’ consistency in implementing IFT – measured by IFT index – and the central 
banks’ performance.
Key Words: Infl ation forecast, infl ation forecast targeting, infl ation forecast targeting 
measurement.
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